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Abstract
This paper shows that countries with weak banking system and fiscal institutions,
might benefit from the presence of foreign banks, which can constitute a
commitment and transparency device. Foreign banks can also reduce the
probability of self-fulfilling speculative attacks. A strong presence of foreign
banks can make a currency peg feasible in the first place by rendering it more
resistant to speculative attacks. The European experience is instructive in this
respect. In all of the candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe
(CEEC) the banking system is now dominated by foreign banks. This is now
taken for granted, but it is unusual if one looks at the existing EU-15 members,
where foreign banks play a marginal role in even the smallest economies.
                                                
* Daniel Gros is Director and Senior Research Fellow at CEPS. This paper was originally prepared
originally for Stockholm conference on “Managing EU Enlargement”Stockholm, 15-17 May, 2002.1
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I. Introduction
It is well known that highly indebted countries, or countries with weak fiscal
institutions, can fall into a low credibility trap. This occurs when a government
loses credibility in the eyes of the financial markets and is forced to pay a risk
premium in the form of higher interest rates. The higher debt-service burden that
results, if inflation is kept low, makes it even more likely that the authorities will
abandon efforts to stabilise the situation and attempt to reduce the real value of
the debt through a surprise inflation. This further increases the risk premium
demanded by financial markets and can lead to a spiral of increasing interest rates
until the government caves in and produces the inflation the market expects.
Moreover, countries with weak financial systems tend to accumulate more public
debt because the government has to bail out banks, which represent powerful
groups (e.g. farming cooperatives, heavy industry). The topic of this paper is to
what extent the presence of foreign banks can mitigate these problems.
One basic prescription of a country with little credibility, and a weak domestic
institutional framework, which make it difficult to commit to low inflation, is to
use an external anchor. For the Central and Eastern European countries the
obvious candidate to be such an anchor would be the euro given that most of
their external trade is with the euro area. Some countries have already de facto
joined the euro area by linking their money via a currency board to the DM, or,
now, the euro (e.g. Estonia, Bulgaria and Lithuania). But can these commitments
be credible? In particular can they withstand the ultimate stress test imposed by
financial markets when interest rates go to astronomical levels so that it becomes
prohibitively expensive to service the debt at stable prices? This paper explores
whether the presence of foreign banks makes this problem more manageable.
What is a foreign bank? The presence of foreign banks usually takes the form of
subsidiaries, rather than branches. It is clear that in most countries there is no
legal distinction between a subsidiary, i.e. a bank whose capital is majority
foreign owned and other, domestically owned banks. In both cases the bank is
incorporated under domestic law and constitutes a separate legal identity.
Moreover, in many cases the top management (the lower level management has to
remain local for obvious reasons) is also local. In a number of countries the
presence of foreigners among the top management is actually limited. Moreover,
a foreign owned bank is usually treated, at least on paper, in exactly the same
way as domestically owned banks in terms of banking supervision, reserve______________________________ DANIEL GROS _________________________________
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requirements, etc. One might thus ask what difference does it make? For the
purposes of this paper it does make a big difference because of something
intangible, namely because of the fact that a foreign bank is usually not subject to
the same domestic political pressures and, therefore, usually does not accumulate
large hidden liabilities on its balance sheet for which the government could in the
end become responsible.
Foreign ownership of the banking system is just one facet of a more general
phenomenon, namely foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI is usually particularly
appreciated because it does not create debt and implies usually also a transfer of
know-how. These reasons apply also in banking. Hence, there are many reasons
why it might be desirable to have FDI in banking, particularly in transition
countries where no banking system existed beforehand so that the skills
necessary for running a bank simply did not exist at the local level. While these
reasons for welcoming FDI in banking might be very important they will not be
discussed in this paper, which will concentrate on how the presence of foreign
banks can improve the efficiency of the macroeconomic framework. For an
excellent discussion of the weaknesses of domestic banking systems in transition
countries see Berglof and Bolton (2002).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the next section shows
some basic data illustrating the importance of foreign banks in the countries from
Central and Eastern Europe which are candidates for EU membership (CEECs).
Section III and IV then present a standard model and its solution if there is no
commitment device. This is followed in section V by a discussion of what
difference the presence of foreign banks can make. The model is meant to be
illustrative of the effects that are likely to operate in countries with weak fiscal
institutions. It does not pretend to be innovative. Section VI then shows how the
equilibrium is affected in the standard cases by the presence of foreign banks.
Section VII uses the model to discuss how a strong presence of foreign banks
can make currency (and public finance) crisis less likely. Section VIII concludes.
II. Foreign banks in Central and Eastern Europe
The importance of foreign owned, or foreign dominated, banks is not one of the
statistics that central banks or finance ministries publish regularly because in
many countries this is not an issue. Moreover, it is not always straightforward to
identify what constitutes a foreign owned bank. The threshold of foreign
ownership mostly used appears to be 50%, but it is possible that even with a
minority participation management can be dominated from abroad. A recent
report from the European Commission, however, gives comparable figures for
the ten candidates for EU membership from Central and Eastern Europe.________________________ WHO NEEDS FOREIGN BANKS? ___________________________
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Table 1. Share of majority foreign-owned banks in total assets (in %)
Panel a. The CEECs
1998 1999 2000 2001
BL 74.4 Na Na Na
CZ 25.7 28.1 65.5 90.1
EE 5.1 90.0 93.0 97.5
HU 58.9 61.8 62.9 65.5
LA 78.7 78.2 77.2 62.6
LI 51.8 38.3 57.0 83.9
PO 16.6 47.2 69.6 68.4
RO 20.0 47.5 50.9 55.0
SL Na 28.2 42.7 81.0
SI 20.0 47.5 50.9 55.0
Source: European Commission (2002).
Panel b. The EU
Ireland 53.8 Netherlands 7.7
UK 52.1 Finland 7.1
Belgium 36.3 Italy 6.8
Greece 21.9 Germany 4.3
Spain 11.7 Austria 3.3
Portugal 10.5 Sweden 1.6
France 9.8 (1996) Denmark N.a.
Source: European Central Bank (1999).
By 2001 foreign banks had more than half of deposits in all of these countries,
and in some of the larger ones (e.g. Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic) the share
of foreign banks is around two thirds. It is thus fair to say that foreign banks by
now dominate the banking system in the  CEECs. It would of course be even
more interesting to have data on the capital invested in foreign banks. But the
dominance in terms of deposits, which presumably translates into a dominance in
terms of loans, implies that foreign banks should also dominate in terms of
capital given that the same prudential standards are applied to domestic and
foreign owned banks.
The situation in the ‘old’ EU-15 is quite different. Panel b of Table 1 shows the
data collected for 1997 by the ECB. It is apparent that in most member countries
foreign banks have only a marginal presence (Luxemburg and the UK constitute
exceptions because of their large off shore banking sectors).______________________________ DANIEL GROS _________________________________
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III. A standard model
How does the presence of foreign banks contribute to macroeconomic stability?
The remainder of the paper explores this question based on a simple model. The
model used here is entirely conventional. The starting point is a standard social
loss function, Lt, given by:
(1) [ ]
2 2
t t t p q L + = a 0 ‡ a
where p t stands for the inflation rate and q t stands for tax revenues as a
percentage of GDP, which is equivalent to the average tax rate. High taxes and
high inflation create distortions and are thus socially costly. The parameter  a
indicates the relative weight of taxes in the social loss function. A high a could
be interpreted to mean that the tax collection system is not efficient, i.e. that it
causes high distortion costs for a given revenue. The experience in Central and
Eastern Europe has shown that there are indeed great differences in the ability of
different countries to raise taxes. In Russia, to take an extreme example, until
recently, the government was not even able to raise 15% of GDP, whereas in
other countries (e.g. Poland, Estonia) government revenues amount to over 30%
of GDP.
1
To concentrate on the issue at hand it is assumed that the authorities can
determine inflation via their control over the money supply (or to be more precise
its growth rate), and that this control is perfect. Hence the authorities can set
directly the inflation rate.
A second standard element of the model is that the authorities (as usual, no
distinction is made between the central bank and the Ministry of Finance) have to
satisfy a budget constraint:
(2) t t t t t t t t p q p i b g b d e m+ - - - + = ) ( ) (
where bt is the public debt/GDP ratio and gt represents (non-interest) expenditure
relative to GDP. The last but one term in this budget constraint represents
seigniorage revenues under the assumption of a constant velocity money demand
function with the cash (or rather monetary base) to GDP ratio constant and
denoted by ì. The constant velocity assumption implies that  seigniorage
increases linearly with the money supply (and hence expected inflation). This is
not realistic, but this assumption was chosen in order to show that the results do
not depend on a ‘ Laffer curve’ for  seigniorage revenues under which the
revenues from the inflation tax fall with very high inflation rates as money demand
goes towards zero.
                                                
1 An alternative interpretation would be that society and/or the politicians in power dislike high taxes
(for example, because their marginal voter is a household with a high marginal tax rate).________________________ WHO NEEDS FOREIGN BANKS? ___________________________
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The shock å t will play an important role later. It arises from the fact that it is not
possible to know the exact amount of public debt in countries with opaque
financial systems. There are many ways in which banks can finance the
government indirectly. Hence it is assumed that  å t represents a surprise, a real
shock with an expected value of zero (meaning its expected component is
already incorporated in gt) and variance se.
2
How important could be these ‘shocks’ to public debt? Table 2 below shows the
data for the so-called stock flow adjustment, i.e. the increase in the debt to GDP
ratio that cannot be explained from the deficit and nominal GDP growth. This
should be exactly what the disturbance å is supposed to represent (although not
all will come from problems in the banking system. The values are quite high for
some countries (above 10% of GDP for Lithuania in 1999, for example). The
standard deviation across the ten  CEESs was 5.2% of GDP in 1999. This is
larger than the average deficit of these countries (which was below 3% during this
year). The average stock flow adjustment was also consistently positive,
increasing from 4 to over 6% of GDP between 1998 to 2000. Unfortunately it is
not possible to analyse a longer time series as the data simply does not exist.
This fact alone provides a further indication of the uncertainty surrounding the
true size of public debts in transition countries.
Table 2. Stock-flow adjustments to public debt ratios
Panel a. CEECs: Increase in debt/ratio not explained by deficit (% of GDP)
1998 1999 2000
Bulgaria -6.5 4.8 3.6
Cyprus 8.8 8.4
Czech Republic 5.7 5.2 7.6
Estonia 0.6 5.1 -0.1
Hungary 8.1 8.1 4.9
Lithuania 6.0 12.2 8.6
Latvia 9.9 5.6
Poland 3.1 4.8 6.6
Romania 8.6 6.4 6.4
Slovenia 4.0
Slovak Republic 6.4 5.0 12.7
Standard deviation across CEEC-10 5.0 2.6 3.3
Average across CEEC-10 4.0 7.0 6.2
Memo: Turkey 11.7 37.3 13.7
Source: Own elaboration on European Commission data.
The average and standard deviation of the stock flow adjustment across the EU
countries are much smaller than for the CEECs, see panel b of Table 2 below.______________________________ DANIEL GROS _________________________________
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Table 2, continued
Panel b. EU countries (as % of GDP)
1998 1999 2000
Belgium -1.6 0 0.3
Denmark -1.7 2.3 -0.1
Germany -0.5 0.2 1.7
Greece 2.4 3.6 5.3
Spain -0.4 1.8 1.4
France 0.1 -0.6 0
Ireland 0.6 4.1 0.7
Italy -1.4 0.1 1.2
Luxembourg 4.1 3.7 6
Netherlands 0.1 0.3 -0.5
Austria -0.7 0.9 0.1
Portugal -1.9 1.1 1
Finland 0.2 2.2 7.6
Sweden 2.6 -0.3 -2.8
UK 0.1 0.9 3.5
Standard deviation across EU 15 1.7 1.5 2.8
Average across EU 15 0.1 1.4 1.7
Sources: European Commission, AMECO.
Other simplifying assumptions are standard: For the sake of simplicity, real
growth is assumed to be zero. Government expenditure could be made
endogenous, as in a number of other contributions on the optimal choice of taxes
and inflation, but this has not been done here as it would not affect the main
results of the paper, which concentrate on the incentive to use surprise inflation
to reduce the real value of the public debt.
2 Another real world qualification could
be that it is implicitly assumed that the monetary base consists only of cash.
Introducing required reserves on commercial banks (which could be
remunerated) would not change the thrust of the analysis. If required reserves
were not remunerated (which is usually the case) the value of µ would just be
somewhat higher.
The crucial point about the budget constraint (2) is that real interest payments,
given by bt(it - pt), are a function of the difference between actual and expected
inflation. The simple form of the budget constraint used here assumes implicitly
that all government debt has the same maturity, equal to the length of the period
of this model. Another interpretation would be that b represents only the
government debt that matures in this period. Interest payments on other
government debt would then be subsumed under general government
                                                
2 See, for example, Mankiw (1987).________________________ WHO NEEDS FOREIGN BANKS? ___________________________
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expenditure. This is not a serious limitation of the model since most emerging
market countries have a relative short average duration of (domestic) debt (and
the little long-term debt that exists is indexed on short-term interest rates
3).
The nominal interest rate, i t, can be written as the sum of inflation and the real
interest rate, required by investors. The latter will be assumed to be constant,
denoted by ñ.
(3) ) ( t t t p E i + =r
The budget constraint that the authorities have to observe can thus be rewritten
as:
(4) t t t t t t t t t p q p p E b g b d e m r + - - - + + = ) ) ( ( ) (
IV. … and a standard equilibrium under discretion
The authorities have to take their decisions before the shocks occur. They try to
minimise each period the expected loss while observing their budget constraint.
The F.O.C. for a minimum of (1), subject to (4), are:
(5) t t
t
t q
q
L
l a - = =
¶
¶
2 0
(6) ( ) t t t t
t
t b p
p
L
m l + - = =
¶
¶
2 0
Where  lt is the shadow price associated with the budget constraint (2)'. As
usual, it is assumed that the government reflects accurately the preferences of
society in setting taxes and inflation.
In order to simplify the notation only the steady state will be considered with a
constant debt/GDP ratio, denoted b.
4 Conditions (5) and (6) then yield a simple
relationship between inflation and tax revenues (as a percentage of GDP):
(7) t t q b p a m) ( + =
This can be substituted into the budget constraint (2)' to obtain an expression for
the steady state “tax rate”. If one assumes that the public anticipates monetary
policy and hence inflation correctly the debt-to-GDP ratio remains constant only
if:
(8) ( ) t t t q b b g q a m m r + - + =
                                                
3 As is well known the time inconsistency problem could also be solved by issuing only foreign
currency or inflation indexed debt. In reality this is not done anywhere.
4In a similar model, Gros (1990) shows that this should not affect the conclusions.______________________________ DANIEL GROS _________________________________
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If expenditure is constant at g, the optimal tax ratio changes only if the realisation
of the interest rate shock is different from zero:
5
(9) ( ) [ ]
( )a m m
m r
+ +
+ +
=
b
b g
q
t
d 1
The expected loss under discretion E(Ldisc ) would then be given by:
(10) ( ) [ ]
( ) [ ]
[ ] { }
2 2
2
2
1
} {
) ( e s r
a m m
a m a
+ +
+ +
+ +
= b g
b
b
L E disc
As usual the discretionary equilibrium is not the first best for the country.
The social optimum, if there were no constraints on credibility, can be calculated
by using the first order conditions (5) and (6), but without the effect of surprise
inflation on debt service in equation (6). This means that in the social optimum
the relationship between taxes and money supply would be given by:
(11) q p SO ma =
Which differs from the corresponding relationship (7) in that only seigniorage is a
valid argument for having inflation. The optimum tax rate is then given by
substituting this expression into the budget constraint (and setting the debt-to-
GDP ratio constant), which yields:
(12) [ ]
[ ] a m
e r
2 1
) (
+
+ +
=
t
SO
b g
q
The expected loss under the social optimum, E(LSO), would then be equal to:
(13) ( ) [ ]
[ ]
[ ] { }
2 2
2 2
2
1
) ( e s r
a m
am a
+ +
+
+
= b g L E SO
which is lower than the loss under discretion. However, in this set-up there is no
way the country could easily reach this bliss point. One way would be to fix the
exchange rate to an external anchor, which for the CEECs would normally be the
euro. This could take several forms: an informal commitment (Latvia), a currency
board (Estonia, Bulgaria, Lithuania) or the outright adoption of the  euro as the
national currency (Montenegro, Kosovo). In whatever form it is done, it implies
the loss of inflation as a tax instrument.
V. The role of foreign banks
This section describes how the presence of foreign banks can make a difference.
There appear to be two ways in which foreign owned banks will affect the
                                                
5 Since this paper's focus is only on steady states, the time subscript will henceforth be suppressed.________________________ WHO NEEDS FOREIGN BANKS? ___________________________
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working of the economy: a) foreign banks are more likely to have transparent
accounts, and, b) foreign banks cannot exert the same pressures for a bail out.
a. Greater transparency
A first consequence of the presence of foreign banks is that they in general are
less likely to lend indirectly to the government and know their books better than
their (unreformed) domestic counterparts. This should limit the potential for
nasty surprises on the true size of public debt.
b. Mitigating inefficiencies in the domestic economic policy process
Since this is a macro model it seems natural to assume that the government and
the central bank take their decisions in terms of inflation and the overall level of
taxation needed to finance a given level of expenditure. If one assumes that the
authorities share the preferences of the population it is then natural to assume
also that the decisions on the two key macroeconomic variables should reflect
the preferences embedded in the social loss function. However, this assumes an
efficient domestic policy process and thus unlikely to be the case in reality,
specially in the new democracies of the  CEECs (which sometimes are entirely
new states).
One particular problem that appears to have been particularly important in the
CEECs is the lack of transparency in the financial system and the pressure put by
large banks to bail them out when it turned out most of their credits had turned
sour. This a particular manifestation of special interest group politics. There are
always special interest groups that plead for special treatment. But it appears that
large banks which had accumulated a large exposure to (ex-post) loss making
enterprises have always been particularly effective in pressuring the central bank
(and ultimately the government) into bailing them out. One important reason
behind this success of (domestic) banks to obtain large bail outs is that the
accumulation of bad debt is not immediately transparent. When it is uncovered it
has usually reached already such size that the banks would go bankrupt if there
were no help. Since no government can seriously consider letting its own banking
system collapse domestic banks usually are saved and their bad debts are paid
by the public exchequer.
Any bail out that is granted to a particular bank (usually representing a particular
domestic constituency, e.g. the farmers, large industrial enterprises, etc.) must of
course be paid for somehow. In this set-up the only alternative source of
revenues is inflationary finance. Using inflation also causes a welfare loss to the
special interest group that obtains the bail out. However, as the part of any group
in the overall budget will be small, this cost cannot fully offset the direct gain
from the bail out (e.g. emergency credit from the central bank). Each special______________________________ DANIEL GROS _________________________________
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interest group thus faces a shadow price of a bail out which is only a fraction of
the economy wide trade-off between inflation and taxes because it takes into
account the fact that the overall inflationary impact any bail out has is likely to be
proportional to the weight of the special interest group concerned. This fraction
should be a function of various elements, for example the share of the interest
group in the overall budget, the extent to which benefits have to be shared with
other groups (a bail out for one bank alone might not be possible, an exemption
for the entire banking system might be acceptable, indeed unavoidable in certain
cases).
6
Foreign owners, with very deep pockets (at least relative to the size of the
potential losses in a CEEC) cannot credibly make the same threat as a domestic
bank (whose owners, if private, and at any rate managers, are anyway likely to be
politically well connected with the ruling elite). Most of the presence of the
foreign banks in the CEECs comes from large, internationally oriented EU banks
for which the CEEC exposure represents only a small percentage of overall
deposits or capital. This is what one would expect given that deposits in the ten
CEECs together represent less than 5% of the sum for the euro area. Moreover,
it is politically much more difficult to sell to the national public the need to save at
great cost a foreign bank. As the likelihood of being bailed out is lower foreign
banks have an incentive to be more prudent in their loan policy. This comes on
top of the fact that foreign owned banks are more likely to avoid making the bad
loans in the first place. In practice this might be the case because they will be less
subject to domestic political pressures. This seems to have happened in reality.
There have been no large scale bail outs involving foreign banks.
c. Modelling the influence of foreign banks
It will be clearest to start with the case in which there are no foreign banks. If
domestic banks dominate the choices of the central bank and the finance ministry
they can determine fiscal and monetary policy (at least at the margin). As the
constituencies of the banks share the same preferences they will still like, ceteris
paribus, lower inflation and taxes, but with their own special interests in mind as
well. In pressuring the finance minister to take over the bad debts of a bank the
special interest groups, which accumulated this debt are of course counting on
the fact that they get all the benefits (i.e. debt relief) whereas society has to carry
                                                
6 For a similar approach, regarding fiscal policy decisions see von Hagen and Harden (1994) with an
analysis of EU member countries in this respect. Velasco, (1998) uses a similar approach with two
symmetric interest groups whereas Drazen (2000) presents (in chapter 10) a model with a large
number of competing groups, which try to extract transfers from the government. For reasons
unrelated to interest groups, a monetary bail out for the entire banking system is also advocated by
Goodfriend and King (1988).________________________ WHO NEEDS FOREIGN BANKS? ___________________________
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all the cost in terms of higher taxes (or rather a combination of taxes and
inflation). In a Nash equilibrium with n banks (or the interest groups they
represent), all identical in terms of size and influence, the minimisation of the loss
function (1) under the budget constraint
7 (4) leads to the following first order
condition, for the setting of the overall average tax rate:
(14) ( ) n q
q
L
t
t
t 1 2 0 l a - = =
¶
¶
where l(1/n) indicates the shadow price perceived by a particular bank or group
of banks. This ‘private shadow price’ is the product of l, the shadow price of
the economy wide budget constraint and (1/n), which indicates the weight of the
bank in the economy, or rather the budget. To make a concrete example.
Assuming there are four interest groups represented in the domestic banking
system and the bank of the farmer’s cooperatives is one of them. It asks to be
bailed out, representing one fourth of the overall economy and the budget
(1/n=0.25). In this case each euro spent on a bail out would be four times as
‘valuable’ to this bank as one euro given to everybody.
8
It was argued above that foreign banks cannot (and in reality do not) participate
in the bail out game. Hence the greater the share of foreign banks the less
important this distortion should become. This can be incorporated in the
approach followed so far by splitting fiscal policy decisions into two areas: one
area is free of special interest groups politics. This area is the one dominated by
foreign banks. In the remainder it is “politics as usual”. Denoting the share of
foreign banks in the overall banking system by s, meaning that the “policy
relevant” shadow price becomes:
(15) ( )( ) [ ] n s s q
q
L
t
t
t 1 1 2 0 - + - = =
¶
¶
l a
When foreign banks dominate the banking system (s goes towards one) the
particular fiscal inefficiency considered here disappears. To save on notation the
fiscal externality in the presence of foreign banks will be denoted by ç, which is
defined by:
(16)  ( )( ) [ ] n s s 1 1- + ” h
                                                
7 It is assumed that the average level of government expenditure remains constant despite the
presence of interest groups.
8 As an aside one should note that the model could also be applied to the case of Argentina (and
perhaps even Russia) if one substitutes special interest groups with provincial governments.
However, if regional governments are the problem the presence of foreign banks should not make a
big difference.______________________________ DANIEL GROS _________________________________
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The parameter ç thus shows the inefficiencies that persist in the decision process
about domestic fiscal policy. As s goes to one, ç also goes to one. Allowing
foreign banks to take over the domestic banking system thus eliminates the bail
out problem.
It is much easier to model the second consequence of the presence of foreign
banks, namely the greater transparency in fiscal accounts. The greater the share
of foreign banks the lower smaller will the shocks to public debt coming from the
banking system. This can be expressed in a slightly modified budget constraint
(17) ( ) t t t t t t t t t s p q p p E b g b d e m r - + - - - + + = 1 ) ) ( ( ) (
The discretionary equilibrium can then be calculated as above, with the only
difference being that the first order condition (5) is substituted by (15) and the
budget constraint by (17).
VI. Equilibrium with foreign banks
The preceding section has provided a way to model the influence of foreign
banks in countries with weak fiscal institutions. This makes it possible to
consider what difference foreign banks can make to the equilibrium by potentially
reducing the social losses associated with excessive inflation. Setting the inflation
rate hits all interest groups in the same way; the first order condition (6) is thus
not affected. However, the inefficiency in the fiscal process implies that the
resulting trade-off between taxes and inflation is different:
(18) ( )
h
a m t
t
q b
p
+
=
This implies that, ceteris paribus, inflation will be higher as all interest groups
push the government to finance their benefits through inflation. As nothing
changes in the remainder of the model (i.e. essentially the budget constraint) the
resulting tax rate under the discretionary equilibrium is given by an equation that
is identical to equation (9) above, except that  a is substituted by  a/h. This
implies that the welfare loss under discretion is given by:
(19) ( ) [ ]
( ) [ ]
[ ] { }
2 2 2
2 1
2 1
, ) 1 (
1
e s r
ah m m
ah m a
s b g
b
b
L if disc - + +
+ +
+ +
=
-
-
where the subscript stands for inefficient fiscal policy. For the remaining it will be
useful to define a composite parameter W, as
(20)   [ ] { }
2 2 2 ) 1 ( e s r s b g - + + ” W .
Ù thus contains the impact of foreign banks on balance sheet transparency.________________________ WHO NEEDS FOREIGN BANKS? ___________________________
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Inspection of equation (19) reveals that the presence of foreign banks is
beneficial because it reduces the social loss from having inefficient fiscal
institutions in two ways:
a)  As the share of foreign banks goes to one the surprises from opaque
balance sheets disappear (the term (1-s)óå). Moreover, any trend
accumulation of debt by domestic banks would disappear, reducing
another element of W.
b) The second effect comes from the rent seeking of special interest groups
which is reduced. This has a more complicated effect on the social loss.
But if one takes the special case of ì=0 it is clear that any increase in s,
which bring ç closer to one, leads to a lower welfare loss.
From these results it is also intuitive that when the authorities can commit
credibly to a tough monetary policy, the usefulness of foreign bank is reduced as
this second effect no longer exist. With a credible low inflation policy special
interest groups cannot get any privileges. Bailing out is impossible because the
key to the central bank has been thrown away. The welfare loss is given by:
(21)  [ ]
[ ]
W
+
+
=
2 2
2
1 a m
ma a
credible L
If follows that the welfare benefit from having more of one’s banking system
owned by foreigners is lower when the country has a stable and credible
monetary framework (for example, a currency board or a central bank with a
well-established independence). A country with weak fiscal and monetary
institutions would gain more from selling its banking system to foreigners than a
country without such problems.
The gain from tying one’s hand should be higher if there are two many hands at
the tiller. This is indeed the case as become apparent if one takes the difference
between the loss for a credible commitment and the loss under discretion. For
the special case of ì=0 this yields the simple expression:
(22)  W = -
-2 2
, h ab L L credible if disc
This expression shows that the lower W (i.e. the more important foreign banks
become) the smaller the welfare gain from a tight commitment to price stability. If
there are no foreign banks the inverse of ç is equal to the number of competing
special interest groups. In this case the gain from tying one’s hand becomes a
function of the square of the number of special interest groups (n), see the
definition of ç (16).______________________________ DANIEL GROS _________________________________
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VII.  Foreign banks and the potential for self-fulfilling currency crises
As the focus of this paper is on the importance of foreign banks there is no
attempt to build a new and sophisticated model of exchange rate crises. There
exist many different models of currency crises. The basic idea emphasised here
is the standard one that a foreign exchange crisis can result if interest rates go so
high that it becomes prohibitively expensive to service the public debt at stable
prices. This can happen after periods during which the authorities have publicly
committed themselves to stabilisation, keeping perhaps the price level constant
for a while. But if investors stop believing this, interest rates go up and it will
become very costly to persevere with stable prices. This is implies that there
might be a potential for multiple equilibria. This also implies that a self-fulfilling
currency crisis become possible. This seems to be the simplest definition one
can give of this type of crisis (also called second generation model crisis in a
survey of the literature).
Under one equilibrium, the authorities initially enjoy a strong anti-inflationary
credibility so that interest rates and the debt-service burden remain low. Under
the other equilibrium, credibility is initially weak so that the government, as long
as it keeps inflation low, has to pay a very high ex post real interest rate. The high
debt burden this implies induces financial markets to doubt the resolve of the
government – a state of affairs that leads to even higher interest rates. Depending
on the parameter configuration, the risk premium could go so high that the
government would find it in the interest of the country to cave in and loosen
monetary policy.
In order to keep things as simple as possible here it assumed that the real
exchange rate is constant so that inflation is equivalent to devaluation. The crisis
scenario considered here is thus a combined fiscal and exchange rate one. This is
not the only way to model foreign exchange crisis, but it seems to be an
approach that is used quite frequently.
It is useful at this point to consider the (ex post) alternatives for the authorities
under two polar assumptions concerning the ex ante beliefs held by the public:
i)  the credibility of the anti-inflationary stance is perfect, and
ii)  the credibility is zero, i.e. investors expect the government to follow the
discretionary equilibrium.
What would be the welfare consequences for the alternatives that are open to the
authorities under these circumstances? If credibility is perfect and the government
does not exploit the trust of the public and investors the social optimum will
result. The resulting welfare losses are calculated in equation (20) above.
However, as is well known, in this situation the welfare loss can be reduced, at________________________ WHO NEEDS FOREIGN BANKS? ___________________________
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least for one period, if the authorities actually do go for inflation. When the
government exploits the public trust, the loss becomes (neglecting all reputation
effects for simplicity):
(23)  [ ]
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This is usually called “temptation”.
The opposite situation arises when the government decides to abstain from
inflation finance of debt (and is hence not giving in to interest groups), but the
public does not believe its credibility (and believes that interest group politics will
in the end dominate), the loss function becomes:
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The appearance of a difference in the denominator of this expression implies that
the welfare cost of sticking to a tight policy in the face of a market which expects
inflation can go to infinity (when  ( ) ( ) [ ]
1 2 2 1 1
- - - + - ah h µ bµ b  goes to zero). This is
not surprising if one takes into account the fact that it can become impossible to
finance the real ex-post interest burden on a large public. For example, when the
debt/GDP ratio is equal to 100% it becomes impossible to stick to zero inflation
when the market will re-finance the debt only at interest rates above 100%. This
implies that it can become impossible to make a fixed exchange rate regime
credible when there is a high combination of public debt (b), an inefficient tax
collection system (high value of  a) and an inefficient system of expenditure
control. As a higher value of h makes it less likely that this happens it follows
immediately that selling the domestic banking system to foreigners could be a
way to make a fixed exchange rate regime more credible.
The four cases can be tabulated in a compact way for the special case of ì=0:
Table 3
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Ex ante:
Stabilise Give up (inflate) Benefit of deviation
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This table shows the four combinations of  ex post outcomes and ex ante
expectations that are possible in this model (with the simplification that µ=0, i.e.
there is no seigniorage).
In this type of model it should be the case that in each row (i.e. given the market
expectations), the loss is always smaller (essentially from lower taxes) if the
government does inflate. It is apparent that is not necessarily the case in the first
row. The last entry could be negative if ç is very small. As 1/ç is equal to the
number of interest groups if there are no foreign banks this implies that the
“temptation” could actually be negative if n is large, i.e. the fiscal institutions are
very fragmented, and if either b (the debt to GDP ratio) or á (the weight of taxes
in the loss function) is very low. The last two conditions just say that the main
problem of the country is not an excessively high debt or an inefficient tax
collection system, but bad interest group politics. Basically this means that if
such a country were to leave a straightjacket that kept fiscal policy under control
it would no longer be able to control the genie that it has unbottled: interest group
politics would run amok. As noted above a stronger presence of foreign banks
increases the temptation (because it means that the discretionary equilibrium
would not be too bad). This implies that countries with reasonable fiscal
institutions might need a stronger political commitment to a fixed exchange rate
than countries, which would otherwise be basket cases in terms of inflation.
Returning now to the normal case in which a temptation to inflate exists (because
interest groups are not too fragmented or because there are enough foreign banks
to keep the process within limits) the issue is whether or not the authorities will
actually give in to this temptation; which depends on whether there are other
costs of inflating and devaluing. These other costs are not captured by the
model. Assume now for simplicity that the cost of reneging on the commitment
to a stable exchange rate and hence price stability is equal to a constant Ã. The
size of Ã should be determined by confidence effects and possibly by the
importance a potential member country of the EU attaches to its credibility. For
example, a currency board should be harder to break (higher value of Ã) than a
commitment within the ERM II. If Ã goes to infinity, the authorities will always
keep price stability because the temptation (the one period lower loss from higher
inflation) is more than offset by the loss of credibility. The markets will anticipate
this as this policy will be credible. And vice-versa, if Ã is very small, the
government will always minimise the loss and hence, as the markets know this,
the discretionary equilibrium is the only solution.
At first sight, it appears that there must be a critical value for Ã that separates
these two situations: if Ã is below this critical value, which is given by the
incentive, the commitment to price stability is not credible and high inflation is the
only possibility. The problem is that the incentive to renege depends on the________________________ WHO NEEDS FOREIGN BANKS? ___________________________
17
interest rate set by the market. If the market sets very high interest rates it might
just be too costly to stick to low inflation. The commitment is really credible only
if it passes the stress test, i.e. if it is still in the interest of the authorities to stick to
the fixed exchange rate even if the markets expect the discretionary equilibrium.
This will be the case only if the cost of remaining tough is smaller than the value
of Ã.
For values of Ã intermediate between the “temptation” and the “stress test”, two
equilibria are possible: if the market initially believes that the government will
stabilise, the loss in terms of higher taxes needed to do so will be low and the
government will stabilise. And vice-versa, if the market initially believes the
government will not stabilise, the cost of stabilising will be high and the
government will indeed not do so.
The region inside which two  equilibria are possible is represented graphically
below:
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The question here is whether the presence of foreign banks affects the size of the
region for Ã with two equilibria. This seems to be the case on two accounts:
a) Concentrating on the transparency provided by foreign banks and neglecting
for the moment the interest group politics by setting n=1 (which implies ç=1) it is
apparent that the difference between the temptation and cost of remaining tough
is proportional to Ù. As this parameter falls with the share of foreign banks, s,
this implies that the range for which two equilibria are possible is reduced by the
presence of foreign banks if they lead to more transparent balance sheets.
b) But foreign banks can also have a strong impact via their effect on interest
group politics, i.e. the value of ç. This apparent when one considers the limiting
case of ç going to áb
2. In this case the denominator of the entry in the lower right
hand corner of table 3 goes to zero because the welfare cost of staying tough in
the face of a sceptical market goes to infinity. In this case there is no way the
authorities can render a fixed exchange rate commitment (or alternatively a
Price stability
not credible
Two equilibria (fair weather
system can survive, if not
tested)
High inflation
(storm proof)______________________________ DANIEL GROS _________________________________
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commitment to price stability via an independent central bank) credible. The
market knows that if the interest rate is fixed at the level corresponding to the
discretionary equilibrium it will not make sense for the authorities to resist. As
above the key condition refers to the relation of the parameter describing
inefficiencies in the fiscal institutions (ç) to the debt/GDP ratio (b) compounded
by the parameter describing the efficiency of the tax system (á). As the upper
bound of ç is equal to one (i.e. when the entire banking system has been sold to
foreigners) it follows that selling banks to foreigners cannot, on its own, make a
fixed exchange rate system resistant to the stress test when the country has a
combination of a high public debt and an inefficient tax collection system (like
Argentina?).
The conundrum that emerges here is thus that countries with inefficient fiscal
institutions and a low presence of foreign banks would gain most from a tight
constraint. But this constraint will in general have difficulties passing the stress
test of financial markets. A strong presence of foreign banks can mitigate the
problem (but not eliminate it).
VIII. Concluding remarks
This paper has used on purpose a standard model to illustrate the channels
through which the presence of foreign banks can mitigate two problems that arise
in countries with weak fiscal institutions and opaque financial systems. Most of
the CEECs belong into this category because when they emerged from decades
of socialist domination they had to create their banking system (including banking
supervision) from scratch and their finance ministries had to face completely new
tasks. As most of the  CEECs also chose to go for financial openness this
exposed them to vagaries of financial markets in which it is sometimes possible
that the prior beliefs of markets force governments to do something they would
have liked to avoid.
One particular mechanism that has contributed to a number of crisis worldwide is
that of a self-reinforcing spiral of higher interest rates on public debt, which
makes it more difficult to service this debt at stable prices and thus further
increases the doubts of financial markets that the debt can actually be serviced.
The long agony of Argentina whose government struggled for years to find the
resources to service its large foreign debt at ever increasing rates constitutes just
the latest, perhaps also the most tragic example, of this mechanism.
The experience of Argentina also shows that even a massive presence of foreign
banks does not constitute a full protection against speculative attacks. One
aspect of the very recent developments in this country confirms, however, a
basic premise of this paper: the Argentine government has so far refused to bail
out the banking system, which is mostly foreign owned. The Argentine authorities________________________ WHO NEEDS FOREIGN BANKS? ___________________________
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have actually gone one step further: they have practically expropriated the foreign
owners by the different conversion rates applied to loans and deposits. This step
has considerably deepened the crisis while improving only marginally the fiscal
position of the government. Such a step would not have been possible in a
country that is candidate for EU membership (or already in the EU).
Among the candidates for EU membership a massive presence of foreign banks
should be unambiguously beneficial in that it should lead to a greater
transparency of the fiscal accounts and mitigate the incentive to bail out banks
who overland to powerful interest groups. Of course, there are other ways to
deal with these problems: a strong banking supervision would render balance
sheets also transparent and giving the finance minister a veto over bail outs (and
an incentive to do so) would also help. But these alternatives either take a long
time or are politically just not feasible in the short run. Experience has shown that
establishing an effective system of banking supervision takes time because it
requires a number of competent staff with the required training and experience,
which was (and in some cases still is) simply not available in the transition
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Hence it might be quicker to sell the
banking system to foreigners than to build up a system of banking supervision
that is strong enough to deal with weak domestic banks.
Similar considerations apply to the other mechanism emphasised in this paper: in
an economy in transition it is more likely than in the settled market economies of
the EU that entire sectors run into such difficulties that they have to closed down
and their banks be bailed out. The case of  Crédit  Lyonnais shows what can
happen even in relatively well organised countries, but the scale of the problem
must be different in transition countries in which the entire industry mix had go
through a complete overhaul in a decade.
As the  CEECs mature their banking supervision will become stronger and the
pace of industrial restructuring will abate. EU membership will accelerate this
change without constituting a discrete step change as the  acquis has already
largely been taken over and the screening process that preceded entry
concentrated on its effective application. Over time the CEECs might then have
less of a need for foreign banks. The newer members might then feel that they are
stuck in a situation, which is different from that of the older member countries.
But in the meantime it will have helped them to weather the transition.
An interesting topic for future research might then be how to organise the EU
system of banking supervision in a situation in which the incentives for bail out
and lender of last resort differ. The new member countries might well take a
much tougher attitude in this respect than the old EU-15 where the many national
central banks still try to jealously defend “their” banks against the intrusion of
foreign capital.______________________________ DANIEL GROS _________________________________
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